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THE AGE 60 RULE - IT IS TIME TO DEFEAT IT!
GENEVE DUBOiS
IMAGINE A MOTHER just had a newborn baby. She prohib-
its her six-year-old son, Tom, to go close to the baby or enter
the baby's room. When Tom asks for a reason, she says, "Be-
cause boys over five years old are rough around babies. It is for
her safety!" As outsiders objectively analyze this situation, our
first question would probably be: how do you know boys over
five years of age will endanger babies? She would reply that she
based her reasoning on several studies that show that boys over
five are rough, and, hence, for the safety of her baby, she firmly
believes that Tom should not go close to the baby. Even without
conflicting theories regarding boys' rough behaviors, we all
know that every child is different and with proper safety mea-
sures, Tom should be allowed to perform his role as a brother
- provide guidance, love, and friendship to his baby sister. The
mother's rule would be even more frivolous if studies of boys'
behaviors actually show conflicting results. A reasonable person
would conclude that Tom has the right to be a big brother, and,
unless he shows any sign of endangering the baby, he should be
allowed to go close to his baby sister. We would easily agree that
a rule like the one in this scenario is invalid, even though its
justification is for the protection of someone else's safety, be-
cause it takes away a person's right without a proper foundation.
If we can make a fair judgment for Tom, then we should not
have any problem making a fair judgment for commercial air-
line pilots by disallowing a rule that prohibits them from being a
pilot or copilot simply because they reach age 60.' This rule is
commonly known as the "Age 60 Rule."'2 Just like Tom's
mother, the Federal Aviation Administration's ("FAA") justifica-
tion for the rule is safety.3 And likewise, the FAA's justification
I See 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (2005).
2 Beatrice Kathleen Barklow, Rethinking the Age Sixty Mandatory Retirement Rule:
A Look at the Newest Movement, 60J. AIR L. & Co.\t. 329, 331 (1994).
3 Id.
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lacks proper foundation. This Comment will show that this is a
critical time to defeat the "Age 60 Rule" and the reasons why the
rule should be defeated. The Comment consists of three main
sections. The first section outlines recent developments in the
airline industry and economy which lead to an urgent calling to
overturn the rule. The second section explains the reasons that
the "Age 60 Rule" should be overturned. The third section
presents some possible alternatives to this rule.
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENT AND HISTORY
To defeat the "Age 60 Rule," society must first understand the
creature's nature. This section explores the history of this forty-
five-year-old rule, and why this is the time to change or eliminate
it.
A. THE HISTORY OF THE "AGE 60 RULE"
The FAA enacted the "Age 60 Rule" in 1959. The rule is codi-
fied under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 4 which
applies to all Part 121 pilots-"commercial aircraft pilots carry-
ing more than thirty passengers or with payloads exceeding
7,500 pounds. '5 The rule states:
No certificate holder may use the services of any person as a pilot
on an airplane engaged in operations under this part if that per-
son has reached his 60th birthday. No person may serve as a pi-
lot on an airplane engaged in operations under this part if that
person has reached his 60th birthday.6
The rule provides no exception.7 In the past 45 years, many
pilots applied for exemptions to this rule, but all were denied by
the FAA and the courts.8 In 1995, this rule extended to the Part
135 pilots-commercial pilots who operate smaller airplanes or
helicopters.9 Therefore, commercial pilots must give up their
4 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c).
5 Barklow, supra note 2, at 331.
6 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c).
7 Id.
8 Brief of Petitioners, Butler v. FAA, 2004 WL 2203953 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No.
C3-1386), available at http://www.age60rule.com/docs/PPF BRIEF_031004.pdf
(citing Yetman v. Garvey, 261 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 2001); PPF v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988); Keating v. FAA, 610
F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1979); Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979); and Starr v.
FAA, 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978)) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
9 Captain Ralph Hunter, Statement Submitted to United State Senate Special
Committee on Aging on Airline Age 60 Rule, 9 PILOT PERSPECTIVE (Oct. 2004).
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positions on their 60th birthdays, regardless of the fact that they
have passed the most rigid physical and simulation tests re-
quired by the FAA. For this reason, the rule gives a whole differ-
ent meaning to the words "Happy Birthday!"
B. WHY THIS IS THE TIME TO DEFEAT THE RULE
Even though the "Age 60 Rule" recently celebrated its forty-
five-year anniversary, society has fought against the rule since its
beginning. The Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA") first chal-
lenged the rule immediately after its enactment in 1959.0 Later
on in 1979, "[t]he aviation subcommittee recommend[ed] over-
turning the "Age 60 Rule" by legislation."' I Within the last five
years, activities to defeat the rule have intensified. In February
2001, a bill to "Establish Age Limitations for Airmen" was intro-
duced to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation to change the mandatory retirement age to 65.12
In March 2003, a bill "[t]o limit the age restrictions imposed by
the Administrator" was introduced to the House of Representa-
tives ("the House"). 3 One month later, a bill introduced to the
Senate came very close to ending the age discrimination among
airline pilots. 14 Currently, a bill "[t] o amend the age restrictions
for pilots" has been introduced to the House to prohibit the
FAA from disallowing a pilot from flying a commercial airplane
solely based on his age.' 5 Although none of these activities have
succeeded yet, two new organizations (Air Line Pilots Against
Age Discrimination and Professional Pilots Federation), which
formed to fight for pilots' rights, are definitely pushing hard to
overturn the rule.'" A strong momentum is emerging in society
to defeat the "Age 60 Rule."
This momentum is gaining, largely due to negative changes in
the airline industry after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the aging
of the baby boomers. The combination of these two factors
Barklow, supra note 2, at 339.
Professional Pilots Federation, Age 60 Rule Chronology, at http://www.ppf.
org/chrono.htm (last visited May 7, 2005) [hereinafter Chronology].
12 Aerospace Medical Association, Aerospace Medical Association Position Paper:
The Age 60 Rule (Jan. 15, 2004), at http://www.age60rule.com/docs/
asma-position.html (last visited May 7, 2005) [hereinafter Aerospace].
13 Id.
14 Id.
-5 H.R. 65, 109th Cong. § 1 (k) (2005) [hereinafter House Hearing].
I See Professional Pilots Federation, at Aw%.ppf.org; (last visited May 7, 2005);
see also Airline Pilots Against Age Discrimination, at www.apaad.org (last visited
May 7, 2005).
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leads to tremendous negative economic and social impact on
the increasingly large number of aging pilots.
1. Negative Changes in the Airline Industry
The 9/11 terrorist attacks have changed Americans' lives in
many ways. The most direct impact is on the airline industry.
Within the first year after the attacks, airlines lost a combined
$7.7 billion and $6 billion the next year, even after the $5 billion
cash bailout from the government.1 7 They also have suffered
more than 80,000 layoffs."' Many airlines filed for bankruptcy
over the past four years, including Delta, US Airways, UAL, ATA,
and Hawaiian Airlines. 9 US Airways, in particular, filed notice
that it would terminate the pension plan for its pilots. 20 UAL
also "announced its deferment of the $72 million payment to its
pension fund. ' 21 When airlines default or shrink their funding
of a pension plan, the federal government's Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") has to assume the plan, "but it
will only be liable for $600 million of the anticipated $2.5 billion
that the plan was underfunded. ' 22 This means that a pilot, who
had expected a pension of about $75,000 per year from the orig-
inal plan, may now only receive about $25,000 per year when he
retires at age 60.23 This is because PBGC penalizes anyone who
retires earlier than age 65.24 If pilots are allowed to work until
age 65, they would receive $45,000 per year instead.25 Moreo-
17 Steve Huettel, Airlines Don't See Relief Over Horizon, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2002, available at http://www.sptimes.com (last visited May 7, 2005).
18 Id.
19 Consumer Affairs, ATA Files for Bankruptcy Oct. 23, 2004, at http://www.con-
sumeraffairs.com (last visited May 7, 2005) [hereinafter ATA].
20 Jim Jubak, The War on Your Retirement, Feb. 7, 2003, at http://moneycen-
tral.msn.com/content/P40620.asp (last visited May 7, 2005).
21 Joseph Kay, United Airlines Announces Deferment on Pension Payments, July 20,
2004, at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/jul2OO4/ual-j20.shtml (last visited
May 7, 2005).
22 Politics and Economy: Pension Pain, at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/pen-
sions.html (last visited May 7, 2005).
23 Id.
24 Paul Emens, Testimony Before House Aviation Subcommittee (Mar. 12,
2003), at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/03-12-03/emens.html
(last visited May 7, 2005).
25 Id.
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ver, senior pilots would continue to pay into their pensions and
Social Security for the additional five years.26
2. Aging of the Baby Boomers
The problem of the $50,000 decrease in pension payment per
year has magnified due to the aging of the baby boomers. De-
mographers predict that by the year 2005, "more than one-half
of the population of the U.S will be over 50 years of age. ' 27 The
number of older pilots also reflects this trend. From 1971 to
1994, the number of older pilots increased more than 300 per-
cent.21 When the "Age 60 Rule" was enacted, there were no ac-
tive airline transport pilots age 60 or over.29 Today, 27 percent
of the U.S. pilots are older than age 50.30 Not only are more
people being affected by the decreased pension plan, but these
people are also ineligible to receive Social Security until age
65.31 Therefore, pilots who are forced to retire at the age of 60
have to struggle through an already impaired economy with
only $25,000 per year of total income.
Although pilots have been challenging the "Age 60 Rule" for
forty-five years, now it is more urgent than ever to change or
eliminate this rule. As one pilot put it in his letter to Senator
Dianne Feinstein, "We are depending on these pensions earned
over more than 30 years of each of our employments with UAL
to pay for our retirement living... [since] the FAA forced me to
retire at age 60[,] I was not able to delay my retirement and
work any additional years to make up for any loss of pension
income. "312 Obviously, more and more pilots are facing the same
problem each year as they blow out the candles on their 60th
26 Jim Gibbons, Testimony Before United States Senate Special Committee on
Aging (Sept. 14, 2004), at http://wwwc.house.gov/gibbons/091404.asp (last vis-
ited May 7, 2005).
27 Janet E. Truluck, Learning Style Preferences Among Older Adults, 25 EDUCA-
TIONAL GERONTOLOGY 221 (May 1, 1999), available at http://taylorandfrancis.
metapress.com (last visited May 7, 2005).
28 Charles LeMenager, You're Never Too Old to Fly, at http://flighttraining.aopa.
org/learntofly/articles/2553.cfm (last visited May 7, 2005).
29 Maxium Age Limitations for Pilots, 24 Fed. Reg. 5248 (June 27, 1959) (codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. pt. 40).
311 LeMenager, supra note 28.
31 From Now On, We Don't Get Social Security at 65, at http://www.seniotjournal.
com/NEWS/SocialSecurity/3-01-27DoNotRetireat65.htm (last visited May 7,
2005) [hereinafter Senior Journal].
3" Letters To Leaders - United Airlines Termination of Pension Plans, USA TODAY
(Jan. 9, 2005) available at https://ssl.capwiz.com/usatoday/bio/userletter/?id=
347&letter_id= 170596656&content_dir=congressorg (last visited May 7, 2005).
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birthday cakes. Society can only expect more intense move-
ments in the next few years to change the Age 60 Rule. The
FAA can no longer say, "there is no pressure to make a
change [,]" as they said in December 2004, to justify not chang-
ing the rule. 33
II. WHY THE AGE 60 RULE SHOULD BE DEFEATED
Not only has the current economic situation created an ur-
gent need to change the rule, but legislative history, extrinsic
evidence, and profound studies all point to one fact: safety was
never and is not the justification for the "Age 60 Rule." For this
reason, all other countries have abandoned the rule and most
organizations and courts in this country see the need to do the
same thing. The Supreme Court appropriately summarized the
negative impact of the "Age 60 Rule" in Western Airlines v.
Criswell:
Increasingly, it is being recognized that mandatory retirement
based solely upon age is arbitrary and that chronological age
alone is a poor indicator of ability to perform a job .... Such
forced retirement can cause hardships for older persons through
loss of roles and loss of income .... Society, as a whole suffers from
mandatory retirement as well . . . skills and experience are lost
from the work force resulting in reduced GNP. Such practices
also add a burden to Government income maintenance programs such
as social security.
34
A. SAFETY WAS NEVER AND Is NOT THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
"AGE 60 RULE"
Since the beginning of the "Age 60 Rule," the FAA has relied
on safety as its justification. This justification is now more ap-
pealing than ever to society because of our increasing concerns
about flying safety after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, if
we evaluate the foundation of this justification, we will find that
it stands on shaky ground because: (1) the FAA's initial reasons
to enact the rule were invalid; (2) extrinsic evidence proves that
safety was never the FAA's real reasoning; (3) the FAA did not
33 Bill Adair and Steve Huettel, Are Pilots Really Too Old to Fly at Age 60?, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 28, 2004, (on file with the Journal of Air Law & Commerce)
[hereinafter Adair].
34 Thomas Wells, From the Cockpit to the Nursing Home: A Look at the Recent Devel-
opments in the Law Concerning The Age-60 Rule, 57 J. AIR L. & COM. 755, 761-62




base its reasoning on well-founded studies; and (4) other
profound studies show contradictory results. The only reason
that it is still standing is because we, as a society, ignore the
truth-safety was never and is not the justification for the "Age
60 Rule." It is time for us to open our eyes and see the crea-
ture's true face.
1. The FAA Did Not Provide Valid Reasons for Enacting the Rule
The FAA released its initial justifications for the "Age 60 Rule"
on June 27, 1959, in a notice to the public released before the
FAA proposed the rule. 5 The notice followed the usual FAA
procedure requiring it to inform the public of the reasoning for
the new rule and to request the public's comments. 36 In the
notice, the FAA provided passenger safety as the main justifica-
tion for the new rule. 7 It supported this position by providing
several reasons that pilots over 60 might endanger passengers'
lives: (1) aging leads to progressive and unpredictable deteriora-
tion of certain important physiological and psychological func-
tions; (2) no method can be used to detect the deterioration of
aging; (3) sudden incapacity might be induced by the increasing
risk of cardiovascular disease among older people; and (4) the
ability to learn is known to decline with age. Although these
reasons sound legitimate, the FAA failed in its justifications to
provide solid evidence that proves a direct causal link between
pilots over age 60 and airplane accidents. The whole view that
the rule is necessary to "assure the highest degree of safety" is no
more than speculation. 9 Therefore, the rule never should have
been enacted in the first place.
The first flaw in the FAA's justification is: it was not based on
occurrence of accidents caused by pilots' age. In reality, no acci-
dent was caused by pilots over age 60 at that time because there
were "no active airline transport pilots aged 60 or over" in 1959
or before.40 In fact, the FAA predicted that there might be 80
active airline transport pilots in that age group by 1962.41 Since
there was no true occurrence of accidents caused by older pilots,
the FAA had to base its whole foundation on pure "theory" and
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"findings" to assess the likelihood of accidents occurring due to
aging pilots.4
2
The second flaw in the justification is: the theory and findings
the FAA used did not establish a likelihood of future accidents
due to aging pilots. The FAA gave few findings to show that
aging causes "progressive deterioration of certain important
physiological and psychological functions" in the general popu-
lation.43 The FAA also stated that "[p] hysical deterioration with
age can, for the most part, be attributed to a progressive degen-
erative process . . . [which would affect] blood vessels."44 It
stated further, "[This] reduces the efficiency of function of bod-
ily systems . . . [and affects] the heart and brain. 45 The FAA
also presented studies regarding incapacity, which stated that
"incapacity occurs without prior symptoms and in the presence
of normal medical findings."46 Moreover, the FAA added, "abil-
ity to learn is [also] known to decline with age. '47 The FAA be-
lieved that this would affect "the introduction of older pilots
into new types of aircraft. '48 Based on these reasons, the FAA
concluded that aging pilots would endanger the lives of
passengers.49
Although on their face these studies are profound and almost
scary, they only applied to the general population and not specifi-
cally to pilots. The FAA would never allow just a regular John
Doe on the street to fly an airplane. To become a commercial
pilot, one must pass stringent physical and psychological tests to
meet the high standard of qualification. 50 As Dr. Robin Wilken-
ing, an occupational medicine specialist, stated in his testimony
to the United States Senate Special Committee on Aging in Sep-
tember 2004, "Pilots tend to be healthier than the general popu-
lation ... [t] heir physical and mental fitness gets more scrutiny
than almost any other professionals .... -"5 Therefore, studies
that apply to the general population cannot accurately predict
the behaviors of pilots. They can be a secondary reference, but









50 See Gibbons, supra note 26.
51 Adair, supra note 33.
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dents that might be caused by aging pilots. Even the FAA admit-
ted that there was a lack of completeness in studies to show a
link between aging deterioration and older people of a specific
occupation.52 Without studies to show pilots' deterioration with
age, there was no direct evidence to establish the theory that
aging pilots at age 60 would be likely to cause more accidents
than pilots in other age groups. To enact a rule that takes rights
away from a group of people based solely on a general inference
is not only unfair, but absurd.
The third flaw in the justification is: age 60 was only an arbi-
trary line. Even if the studies in the notice applied to the pilots,
which they did not, none of the studies established that age 60
was where the line should be drawn.53 In fact, the FAA admitted
that "presently available data do not permit any precise determi-
nation of the specific age at which continued activity as a pilot
can be said conclusively to constitute a hazard to safety. '54 The
studies in the notice actually produced somewhat conflicting re-
sults with the age 60 line that the FAA drew. One study showed
that "the death rate from heart disease... has been found to be
ten times greater for persons aged 45 to 64 than for those aged
25 to 44. "55 It further stated that "[bly age 65, cardiovascular
disease... causes more deaths than all other medical conditions
combined. ' The FAA also stated that "it is known. . . from
available studies... that the detrimental effects on physiological
and psychological functions have become significant by age
55."57 According to these studies, the logical age line that the
FAA should have drawn was age 55, not 60. This might have
been reasonable in 1959 if the general population was allowed
to be pilots because the average life expectancy at birth in 1960
was only 69.7.58 Of course, the age 55 line would not apply now-
adays because the average life expectancy has risen to 82.4 in






58 Todd Raphael, Why Senior Citizens Should Fly - Raising Retirement Age for Pilots
- Brief Article - Statistical Data Included, April 2001 (on file with the Journal of Air
Law & Commerce).
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2004.51 Drawing a line at age 60, the FAA went against its own
studies. Therefore, age 60 was an arbitrary line.
By analyzing the original reasoning the FAA provided in its
notice to enact the "Age 60 Rule," it is obvious that (1) the FAA
did not base it on any true occurrence of accidents caused by
pilots who have turned 60; (2) the FAA failed to establish the
likelihood of accidents that might be caused by aging pilots be-
cause no studies were specifically done on pilots' deterioration
with age; and (3) age 60 was an arbitrary line that was lacking in
scientific proof. Without well-founded proof, the link between
pilots over age 60 and airplane accidents is totally hypothetical.
Since there is no link, the "Age 60 Rule" has nothing to do with
"assur[ing] the highest degree of safety" in the sky.6 ° Safety was
only an excuse that the FAA used to enact the rule in 1959. A
rule that should not have been enacted in the first place cannot
be allowed to continually stand on its shaky ground.
2. Evidence Proves That Safety Was Not the FAA's Real Reasoning
Besides the fact that the notice to the public reflected that the
true reasoning for the "Age 60 Rule" was not safety, a large
amount of extrinsic evidence also confirmed this finding. In a
letter dated April 17, 1959, from the FAA's first administrator,
Elwood Quesada, to the Reverend Theodore Hesburg, Quesada
urged Hesburg to serve on a board to approve the Age 60 Rule:
"There exists at present no sound scientific evidence that airline
piloting, or any other aeronautical activity, becomes critical at
any given age. 61 In the same year, the "FAA admitted that there
was neither operational nor historical support for its new regula-
tion" in its official press release for the Age 60 Rule.62 When a
reporter asked, "Has it been demonstrated that age is a factor in
the occurrence of air carrier accidents?" The FAA replied, "No.
Fortunately there are very few air carrier accidents. ''63 From the
beginning, the FAA's in-house lawyers stated that "there was no
59 Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRS), Internal Revenue Serv. Publ'n No.
590 (2004), Appendix C, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p590.pdf
(last visited May 7, 2005) [hereinafter IRS].
60 24 Fed. Reg. at 5248.
61 Bert Yetman, Statement to Nat'l Civil Aviation Rev. Comm'n (Oct. 8, 1997)
[hereinafter Yetman] (on file with the Journal of Air Law & Commerce).
62 Letter from Samuel D. Woolsey to Marion C. Blakey, Administrator, FAA
(Jan. 15, 2003), at http://www.age60rule.com/docs/data-quality-Itr.html (last




evidence that could provide any 'scientific or factual justifica-
tion' for the rule.""4 Later on, a senate report stated that "the
rule was adopted 'without the benefit of medical or scientific
studies and without public comment.' ''"1 5 In 1984, the Federal
Air Surgeon, Dr. Frank Austin, stated in his letter to Dr. Stan
Mohler, a former FAA medical staff member, "There is no medi-
cal basis for the Age 60 Rule. I believe this and Admiral Engen
(then FAA Administrator) believes this. It's an economic
issue."""
If it was not for the safety reason, then why did the FAA enact
the Age 60 Rule? The answer can be found in the Federal Air
Surgeon's statement, "It's an economic issue.""7 The rule was
actually based on a labor dispute between American Airlines
("AA") and its pilots in the 1950s.68 At that time, "airlines were
facing huge costs to train pilots for a new wave of jet planes,
including the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8.""9 In order to re-
duce costs, airlines wanted to fire their older pilots and hire
70younger pilots because younger pilots were cheaper to train.
Because of this, AA President C.R. Smith got in a dispute with
his pilots.7 ' In order to not reinstate the three older pilots who
had brought a grievance against his carrier, Smith turned to his
old friend with clout, Elwood Quesada, who was the first FAA
Administrator.72 Smith stated that there should be a suitable
age for pilots to retire.73 Of course, the FAA could not solely
rely on Smith's request to justify the "Age 60 Rule," so it "relied
on medical studies about how aging affected the body and
mind" of the general population.7 ' The study was never in-
tended to apply to pilots. 75 The FAA "issued its Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking. . . less than one month after Quesada
received Smith's personal entreaty asking for such a rule. ' 7" In
64 Petitioners' Brief, supra note 8.
65 Adair, supra note 33.
66 Yetman, supra note 61.
67 Id.
68 Gibbons, supra note 26.
69 Adair, supra note 33.
70 See id.
71 Id.
72 Id.; Vincent Czaplyski, The Age 60 Rule: How It Came To Be, at http://www.
avweb.com/cgi-bin/udt/im.display.printable?client.id=avweb&story.id= 181875
(last visited May 7, 2005).
73 Adair, supra note 33.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Czaplyski, supra note 72.
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a way, Quesada personally believed that this rule was reasonable
because of his "military flying experience with younger pilots
and with pilots retiring from the military as young as 38 years of
age.
77
Other events that developed in the next forty-five years also
prove one fact-the FAA did not believe that pilots, at age 60,
would be more likely to cause airplane accidents. For example,
the rule does not apply to federal agency pilots, including the
FAA's own pilots, who share the same airports and skies with
commercial pilots. 78 The rule also does not apply to test pilots
or NASA astronauts whose jobs demand even more intense phys-
ical and psychological activities than commercial pilots. 79 In ad-
dition, the rule does not apply to military pilots, including the
pilot that flies the President's Air Force One. ° Naturally, if the
FAA truly believed that pilots over age 60 would be more likely
to cause accidents, it would not have allowed them to fly air-
planes that carry the President of the United States, or its own
people, including the FAA Administrator. Moreover, it would
not have allowed those pilots to share the same airports or skies
as commercial airplanes.
The extrinsic evidence not only showed that there was no sci-
entific basis to justify the "Age 60 Rule," but it also proved that
the FAA never believed in its safety justifications. From the be-
ginning, the FAA has been using "safety" as its shield to defend a
rule that takes away people's right to work, so that a small group
of businesses could obtain economic benefits.
3. The FAA Did Not Base Its Reasoning on Well-Founded Studies
To continually build up its "safety" shield, the FAA knew that
it must provide some scientific studies to support its "safety" jus-
tification. Without scientific proof, the "safety" shield would
break, and the "Age 60 Rule" would be defeated. The FAA un-
derstood that even though there was no scientific basis to back
up the initial approval of the rule, as long as there are support-
ive scientific proofs later on, the public would stop questioning
its validity. Therefore, the FAA contracted different studies over
the years to show a link between pilots over age 60 and airplane
77 Robert W. Routh, Aviation and Aging Pilots, 12 AIR & SPACE L. 6, 21 (1997).





accidents.8 However, the scientific studies have proven to be
biased and misleading.8 2
Out of the five major studies since 1978-IOM report, NIH
report, Golaszewski study, Hilton Systems, and CAMI study-all
the statistical analyses except the Hilton Systems "create [a] false
appearance of an increase in risk by aggregating large amounts of
extraordinarily safe [commercial] pilot data with those of vari-
ous other classes of far less safe pilots." 3 These studies com-
pared the number of accidents with the number of total flight
hours by putting the total flight hours in the denominator of the
rate equation: Number of Accidents / Total Flight Hours. 4 The
total flight hours are contributed by the flight hours of commer-
cial pilots (Class I) and pilots from all other classes who are far
less safe (Class II and III).15 Therefore, the formula is: Number
of Accidents / (Commercial Pilots Flight Hours + Class II Flight
Hours + Class III Flight Hours)." The smaller the denominator
is, the larger the risk would be. 7 The problem exists when the
commercial pilots' flight hours suddenly disappear due to the
pilots' retirement at age 60.88 Since the commercial pilots con-
tribute a disproportionate amount of flight hours to the denom-
inator, the sudden loss of their flight hours decreases the
denominator significantly.8 9 This creates an illusion that the
risk has increased among pilots who are 60 or over.90 This is
called the "Age 60 Rule Effect."'"
The initial IOM study was conducted in 1978 by the National
Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine.92 The study actually
showed that age is not a significant factor of the subtle changes
in pilots."93 In response to this report, the National Institute of
Aging produced a NIA report, which concluded that "there
[was] no convincing medical evidence to support age 60, or any
s1 See Woolsey, supra note 62.
82 Id.




87 See Woolsey, supra note 62.
88 See id.
89 See id.
, o See id.
61 Id.
92 Id. (citing Airline Pilot Age, Health and Perfonnance: Scientific and Medical Con-
siderations, Inst. of Med., Nat'l Acad. of Sci., Washington, D.C., March 1981).
93 Woolsey, supra note 62.
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other specific age, for mandatory pilot retirement" of commer-
cial pilots. 94 However, the report still recommended retaining
the "Age 60 Rule" because the "risk of accident increased with
pilots above age 60." 95 Not only was the NIA study corrupted by
the "Age 60 Rule Effect," but the Director of the NIA, Dr. T.
Franklin Williams, later admitted that the NIA panel had been
'conned' by the FAA.96 He stated, "The NIA Report represented
a compromise intended to produce incremental change by the
FAA. At the time the NIA Report was issued, many of its mem-
bers, if not all, believed the FAA had already informally agreed
to institute a program of post-60 piloting as recommended."9 7
Shortly after this statement, the NIA withdrew the NIA report
because "[the] NIA felt that - in its refusal'- the FAA had
reneged on its promise to work to gather reliable data."9 "
Next, the FAA extensively relied on the Golaszewski 1983
Flight Time Study.99 The study concluded that accident rates
increase after pilots reach age 60.00 However, this study had
been criticized by many different sources. First, the Hilton Sys-
tems Study, conducted in 1993, criticized the Golaszewski study
as being "inappropriate" and "misleading" because it had the
"Age 60 Rule Effect."10 1 The Journal of the American Geronto-
logical Society gave the same criticism. 102 Even the Industrial
Relations Court of Australian rejected the Golaszewski study for
the same reason. 10 The court stated that "the Golaszewski
study.. .is deeply flawed." 104 The court recognized the "Age 60
Rule Effect" in the study and stated, "I find it surprising, when I
take that point into account, that the increase in post-60 acci-
94 Id. (citing Report of the National Institute on Aging Panel on the Experienced Pilots
Study, Dep't of Health and Human Serv., Pub. Health Serv., Nat'l Inst. of Health,
Nat'l Inst. on Aging, Bethesda, MD, August 1981).
95 Id.
96 Id. (citing Declaration of T. Franklin Williams, M.D. for Hearing, Oct. 22,
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dent rate is as small as it is. '" 15 Even the Executive Officer of the
Office of the Assistant Administrator for Aviation Safety, Mr.
Kenneth Chin, rejected the Golaszewski study as a final prod-
uct. "" In a letter from Mr. Chin, dated July 24, 1991, he stated,
"It should be noted that [the Golaszewski] study is unofficial be-
cause it was never formally published by the [FAA] .... We have
not formally accepted this study as a final product because there
are major data deficiencies .... [Any] use of this study to support
any position may be questionable at best. . . ."' Even the
study's author, Mr. Golaszewski, stated that the study was not
meant to be used to prove the performance of airline pilots.""
In an interview with ABC News 20/20, the moderator, Stone
Phillips, presented to Mr. Golaszewski that when pilots recalcu-
lated Golaszewski's accident rates by eliminating the "Age 60
Rule Effect," "the accident rate for active pilots in their 40's and
50's was higher than for pilots in their 60's. And pilots in their
70's had the lowest accident rate of all."'' 9 In reply, Mr. Golas-
zewski said, "But you have to realize, in fairness, that I never set
out to answer this question about the performance of airline pi-
lots."'" Obviously, the FAA had relied on a misleading source
to defend the "Age 60 Rule."
The only valid study that the FAA based its justification on is
the Hilton Systems Study, which was conducted in 1990 by
Hilton Systems, Inc. and Lehigh University."' The FAA not
only contracted with these two organizations to specifically per-
form a study on pilots' aging and accident rates, but it also con-
tracted for a specific person to monitor this study." 2 Based on
the study's cautionary hint of 63 as a possible cut-off age, the
FAA concluded that the "Age 60 Rule" should not be
changed." 3 Unlike the previous studies, the Hilton Systems
Study was not corrupted by the "Age 60 Rule Effect" because
Lehigh University refused to combine data from different medi-
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zewski study had made. 1 5 The original report that the Hilton
Systems Study submitted to the FAA concluded that (1) com-
mercial pilots are the safest pilots in the system - "not merely the
safest, but by orders of magnitude," (2) the "analyses provided
no support for the hypothesis that the pilots of scheduled air
carriers had increased accident rates as they neared the age of
60," and (3) "the data for all the various groups of pilots were
remarkably consistent in showing a modest decrease in accident
rate with age ..... 116 In fear that the FAA would not be satisfied
with the conclusion of this study, the contracting employee, who
monitored the study, requested Lehigh University to come up
with a cut-off age." 7 Lehigh University came up with age 63 by
only observing pilots who do not fly commercial airlines (Class
II and III)."11 But the University stated that "these analyses give
a hint, and a hint only, of an increase in accident rate for Class
III pilots [the ones that do not fly commercial airlines] older
than 63 years of age.""' 9 The FAA disregarded this statement
and concluded that the study had drawn a line at age 63, and,
hence, the "Age 60 Rule" should not be changed or
eliminated. 120
The most recent study that the FAA cites is the CAMI study.1 21
This study was conducted in response to the Senate Appropria-
tion Committee's request for the FAA to perform a precisely de-
fined statistical analysis on age versus accident rate. 122 This
study produced four different reports. 2 ' The reports basically
corroborated the findings in the Golaszewski study-accident
rate increases after pilots turn age 60.124 However, the CAMI
study made the same mistake as the Golaszewski study and was
corrupted by the "Age 60 Rule Effect."' 25 One interesting note
from Report 3 of the study was that when studying the accident
rate of Part 135 pilots, who could fly past age 60 until 1995,













aged group and the group that was between ages 60 to 63.126
Similar to the Hilton Systems Study, the FAA ignored the unfa-
vorable findings in Report 3 and concluded that since the acci-
dent rate increases after pilots turn 60, the "Age 60 Rule" should
remain. 121
On January 15, 2003, Samuel D. Woolsey, an advocate for
overturning the "Age 60 Rule" and the creator of the Age 60
Rule website, filed a complaint with the FAA under the
Paperwork Reduction and Data Quality Acts regarding to the
false studies the FAA relied on over the years.1 28 The FAA's re-
sponse was that they were "matters of interpretation and empha-
sis rather than fact."' 129 The FAA also cited courts' rulings in
past cases, which "recognized that the Golaszewski Flight Time
Study [had] some value, even though it [had] flaws." '' Finally,
the FAA concluded that "the 'Age 60 Rule' is a long-standing
operational rule that pre-dates studies completed
subsequently." 3
In defending the "Age 60 Rule" for the past forty-five years,
the FAA not only repetitively disregarded the unfavorable data,
but it also relied on biased and misleading studies. Since scien-
tific proof is the foundation of the safety justification without
reliable scientific studies, safety is merely an illusion that the
FAA has created in order to prolong the life of the "Age 60
Rule."
4. Studies Show Contradictory Results
Although the FAA bases its justifications on false studies, it
still continually and fiercely argues that there is a strong likeli-
hood of accidents occurring due to the deterioration caused by
the natural aging process of pilots. The FAA supports its argu-
ment with four major concerns: incapacitation, decrease in
learning ability, unpredictability of the aging process, and im-
possibility to detect problems. However, many studies provide
results that are contradictory to the FAA's position in those four
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The FAA's first concern regarding the aging of pilots is inca-
pacitation. In 1959, the FAA argued that because of the physical
deterioration with age, aging pilots may experience sudden in-
capacitation due to cardiovascular disease.1 32 The FAA sup-
ported its claim with studies concluding that "the death rate
from heart disease . - . has been found to be ten times greater
for persons aged 45 to 64 than for those aged 25 to 44."133 To-
day, the FAA is still hanging onto this argument even though no
further study in the last forty-five years has supported this posi-
tion. In fact, most studies show that the "concern over pilot's
incapacitation causing a crash is simply unjustified.' '1 34 It is un-
justified because the chances of incapacitation occuring due to
cardiovascular disease is extremely low. 13 5 According to the
IATA data and simulator data, "the risk of incapacitation due to
cardiovascular disease is only 1 event in more than 20 million
flight hours. The calculated probability of a crash occuring as a
result of incapacitation is [only] 1 event in every 8.3 billion flight
hours.' 13 6 In other words, there is only 1 episode every 400
years. 13 7 The study conducted by the Civil Aviation Authority
("CAA") of England also confirmed this conclusion. 13 It stated
that "a major structural failure of the aircraft was 10 million
times more likely to occur than a pilot incapacitation. 13 9 Based
on this information, the CAA raised its pilots' mandatory retire-
ment age to 65.14° Other studies show that 80 percent or more
of pilots' incapacitation is due to gastrointestinal problems and
not cardiovascular disease as the FAA claims. 4' In other words,
passengers should fear their pilots having a bad hot dog much
more than a heart attack or stroke. 142
Moreover, "the FAA's. strict safety rules leave little chance that
incapacitation would cause a crash." 43 As a Southwest Airlines
132 24 Fed. Reg. at 5248 (June 27, 1959).
133 Id.
134 Robin Wilkening, The Age 60 Rule: Age Discrimination in Commercial Aviation,
(Mar. 2001), at http://www.pilotfriend.com/aeromedicine/2.htm (last visited
May 7, 2005).
135 Id.
136 Id. (emphasis added).
137 Id.
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captain, Stan Sutterfield, testified, "There are two pilots on
board for the same reason we have two engines on the plane
and two types of every (critical) system." '44 He was referring to
the safety net feature that the FAA implemented, which is com-
monly known as the "fail-safe operation."' 4 5 In fact, this system
requires larger commercial airplanes to have three pilots on
board: a captain, a co-pilot, and a flight engineer.'4 6 If anything
happens to the captain, the co-pilot can easily take over and
maintain control of the airplane. A 1966 study by the Irish Air
Line Pilots' Association and Aer Lingus applauded this sys-
tem. 14 7 The study examined the risk of accident resulting from
pilots' "incapacitation in conjunction with the elimination of
the third crewmember (flight engineer) on the new... BAC 1-
11 aircraft."' 48 The study concluded:
[W] hen both pilots are fully qualified: The total incapacitation of
one pilot in the operation which was examined does not consti-
tute an emergency condition of any greater magnitude than the
other emergencies which the aircraft and its systems are designed
to control. In a words, the 2-pilot crew complement in the opera-
tion is fail-safe.' 49
Since the risk of the pilots' incapacitation is extremely low
and the chance of any incapacitation causing a crash is almost
non-existent, the FAA's concern over pilots' incapacitation caus-
ing a crash cannot be justified. Maybe that is why "there has
never been a US air carrier accident due to [a pilot's medical
problem] "
The FAA's other concerns are aging pilots' ability to learn and
their cognitive performance. At the time the "Age 60 Rule" was
enacted, airlines were in the process of introducing a new wave
of jet planes into the aviation market, including the Boeing 707
and Douglas DC-8.151 Airlines were not only concerned about
the training costs, but they were also questioning how fast the
144 I(.
145 Barklow, supra note 2, at 352-53; see Woolsey, supra note 62.
146 Barklow, supra note 2, at 353.
147 Woolsey, supra note 62.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Press release, Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association, Union President: It's
time for Capitol Hill to end the Age 60 Rule (Sept. 17, 2004), at http://www.
swapa.org/PressRelease/091704-Age6O.pdf (last visited May 7, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Southwest Press Release].
151 Adair, supra note 33.
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older pilots could learn these new technologies. 5 2 The FAA's
statement in the 1959 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking reflected
these concerns.1 53 It stated, "[T]his decline [of the ability to
learn] is one of importance to the introduction of older pilots
into new types of aircraft."'154 The FAA believed that the older
pilots would have a difficult time learning and retaining the new
materials because "it requires the 'unlearning' of previously ac-
quired knowledge and skills.' 1 55 Therefore, the FAA thought
that "the technology may be too complicated for older pilots."'' 56
The FAA continues to use this argument today because new jets
are still being introduced to the market each year. However, the
FAA's belief in the decline of learning ability among older pilots
is false. Studies conducted throughout the years on learning
ability and age show that:
(1) "The intellectual decline depends more on the environment
than on aging [because]... evidence [proves that] in many
respects the healthy old brain is similar to the healthy young
brain."157
(2) There is "no significant difference in learning styles of com-
mercial airline pilots when categorized by age. 158
(3) Difference in learning style is really based on gender and
educational background.1 59
The interesting finding in the studies is that while different
occupations and ages have different types of learning style, the
learning style between the entire pilot population and the adults
between ages 60 to 65 are the same-"abstract conceptualiza-
tion.' 60 According to this, the older pilots possess an even
stronger trait than the younger pilots in learning the pilot-spe-
cific knowledge. Therefore, it is only a myth that older pilots
cannot be trained as successfully as younger pilots. In fact, im-
provements in technology can only mean that "pilots have
planes that are easier to fly.' 161
152 See id.
153 See 24 Fed. Reg. at 5250.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Barklow, supra note 2, at 334.
157 Truluck, supra note 27.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. (emphasis added).
161 Statement of Jagadeesh Gokhale before United States Senate Special Com-
mittee on Aging (Sept. 9, 2004), at http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-jg040909.
html (last visited May 7, 2005) [hereinafter Gokhale Statement].
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The FAA also argues that along with the decline in learning
ability, aging pilots also experience deterioration in their cogni-
tive performance.162 However, the FAA bases its argument
purely on an assumption that if the general population has the
likelihood to lose their mental capacity at the age of 60, then
pilots must have the same aging progress. This is a false assump-
tion because "pilots are selected for good health at the start of
their careers and are subjected to comprehensive medical exam-
inations every 6 months."'163 Any symptoms of cognitive decline
or mental illness must be detected and corrected.'64 If the de-
cline becomes too serious, the pilot will be dismissed from his
position. 165
The FAA has vigorously argued that it is impossible to detect
the unpredictable aging process because " [t] he extent to which
individual parts, or the body in general, are affected by [aging]
cannot be determined accurately by available methods of exami-
nation."' 66 The FAA also said that "current tests can predict the
course of medical deficiencies accurately but cannot accurately
predict the deficiencies accompanying the aging process.' 167
This argument is not valid because "sophisticated and readily
available testing programs have been used by the FAA for more
than 20 years to determine airline pilot fitness for duty."168
These tests are not only widely accepted as having predictive
value, but they are also used to test pilots under 60 who return
to their positions after surgeries, alcoholism, drug abuse, and
psychiatric illnesses. 169 In addition, "computerized neurop-
sychological test batteries have been developed.""17 These tests
have proven to be accurate in evaluating age-related changes in
performance that are critical in pilots' ability to safely perform
flight duties.17 ' Even if no sufficient test is available to accu-
rately detect the aging changes, the safety of the passengers will
not be in jeopardy. This is because "chronological age by itself
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has-little bearing on safety performance [of a pilot] .,172 In fact,
one study, which was conducted by the Office of Technology
Assessment ("OTA"), stated that "'a battery of tests that would
perfectly predict the risk of developing medical illnesses [based
on age]. . .would have a small impact on pilot accident
rates.' ' 173 This is because, according to both Hilton Systems
Study and Aerospace Medical Association Study, accident rate is
actually lower among older pilots (ages 60 to 63) than other age
groups.1 74 Since no link has truly been established between pi-
lots' age and accident rate, the lack of a sufficient test to predict
the aging progress is irrelevant. The important thing is the pi-
lots' health status, which can be accurately detected by the bat-
tery of tests that are currently in place. 17 Therefore, the FAA's
argument regarding the lack of accurate tests to detect aging
changes is really baseless.
The results from the scientific studies not only contradict the
FAA's arguments, but some of them also prove that older com-
mercial pilots may actually be safer than their younger col-
leagues. Even the FAA admits that a person's judgment and
reasoning can be retained for a long period of time and im-
proved with age. 176 Many studies also show that "[p] erformance
in most flight-related tasks such as decision-making, tracking,
takeoff, and landing does not differ significantly between older
and younger pilots."'1 77 Therefore, not only do most critical per-
formance abilities remain with age, some of them actually im-
prove as a pilot ages. Many studies show that older commercial
pilots have far more experience than other pilots, and pilots
with more experience are safer. The most recent study of 3,306
commuter plane pilots found that "pilots. . .with more than
5,000 hours of flight experience had less than half the risk of a
172 Karen Blum, Older Pilots OK to Fly, Study Shows, Airline Pilots Against Age
Discrimination, (May 22, 2003, at http://www.apaad.org/olderpilotsok.htm (cit-
ing Li, Guohua et al, Age, Flight Experience and Risk of Crash Involvement in a Cohort
of Professional Pilots, Am. J. of Epidemiology, Vol. 157, No. 10, 874-880 (May 15,
2003) (last visited May 7, 2005).
173 Wells, supra note 34, at 761.
174 Letter from Robin Wilkening to Jim Gibbons, Congressman (May 11,
2001), Airline Pilots Against Age Discrimination, at http://www.apaad.org/
wilkening-to-gibbons.htm (last visited May 7, 2005) [hereinafter Letter from
Wilkening]; Aerospace, supra note 12.
175 Blum, supra note 172.
176 See 24 Fed. Reg. at 5248.
177 Blum, supra note 172.
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crash than less experienced counterparts."'' 78 The McFadden
Study confirms this finding, as it concludes that "accident rates
of U.S. [commercial] airline pilots declined as pilot experi-
ence... and age increased."'' 79 Since the commercial pilots con-
tribute to the most flight time, they have more experience than
other pilots. And since they gain more experience as they age,
they are actually safer as they get older. This explains why there
is a decline in accident rates with pilots ages 60 to 65.8'
In summary, studies have continuously proven the invalidity
of the FAA's justifications. Its concerns of incapacitation, de-
crease in learning ability, and impossibility to detect the aging
process are illogical. The only purpose that those arguments
serve is to trigger our human instinct and perception about ag-
ing. When we think of people over 60, we probably think of
them as "old" people who start to loss their physical and mental
capacity."8 ' This negative perception convinces us to believe in
the illusion the FAA created - pilots over 60 will endanger our
lives. Because of our preconception of aging, we do not ques-
tion or analyze the FAA's justifications. We allow it to hide be-
hind a shield called "safety" and tolerate a rule that
discriminates against pilots based solely on their age. The FAA
said that there is a lack of "scientific consensus" to change the
rule. ' 2 The truth is, however, that there was a lack of scientific
evidence to enact the rule in the first place. A rule that was
enacted without foundation should not require "scientific con-
sensus" to overturn it. If the FAA would stop relying on the bi-
ased studies and objectively analyze all available studies, it will
see that there is in fact a "scientific consensus" to defeat the
rule.
178 Id.
179 Aerospace, supra note 12.
8s0 See id.
I'l Mandatory Retirement: Craig Says Flexibility Needed for Retirement Rules for Pilots -
But Safety First, U.S. Sen. Special Comm. on Aging, (Sept. 14, 2004), at http://
aging.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=pressReleases.Detail&PressReleaseid=
442&Month=9&Year=2004 - 25k (last visited May 7, 2005) [hereinafter Craig].
182 108 Cong. Rec. S10,502 (Thomas Legislative Information On The Internet,
Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Robert Smith), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?r107:SllOC1-0008:. (last visited May 7, 2005) [hereinafter 108
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B. OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY ABANDONED THE
"AGE 60 RULE"
Because there is no justification for the "Age 60 Rule" at least
24 foreign nations have either eliminated the rule or changed
the mandatory retirement age to either 63 or 65.'1 3 The United
States is now one of the very few countries that still defends the
"Age 60 Rule."' 84 Australian Chief Justice Wilcox said, "Given
the time and effort expended in America examining the age 60
rule, it is remarkable to say so, but it seems to me that none of
the cited studies supports any conclusion about the relationship
between that rule and aircraft safety." 185 Australia, along with
Canada and New Zealand, has no maximum age restrictions for
pilots anymore.1 8 6 Similarly, Japan, after conducting a study of
its over-60 pilots and found that none had been involved in an
accident during the three-year study period, raised its age limit
from 63 to 65. 17 The European Union (12 nations) also offi-
cially changed its age limit to 65.188 Most interestingly, some
countries do not require additional testing for pilots over age
60, and some added operational restrictions, proficiency checks
and medical surveillance for older pilots? 89 One after another,
countries around the world have recognized the rule is
grounded on a set of illogical reasoning. Eventually, the United
States will be standing alone to defend this rule. It is time for us
to join the world and open our eyes to the truth - the "Age 60
Rule" was wrongly enacted and should be overturned.
C. ORGANIZATIONS' SUPPORT IN OVERTURNING THE RULE
The good news is that organizations in the U.S. have started
to see the need to change or eliminate the "Age 60 Rule." In
fact, airlines have been huge supporters of modifying the rule,
even though they wanted the rule to be enacted in the first
place. 9 ° Ironically, they want the rule to be modified for the
183 CRuci, supra note 181.
184 See id.; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 8.
185 Chronology, supra note 11.
186 Aerospace, supra note 12.
187 Id.
188 Chronology, supra note 11.
189 Id.; Statement of Russell B. Rayman, Executive Director, Aerospace Med.
Assoc., before U.S. Senate Special Comm. on Aging (Jan. 2004), at http://aging.
senate.gov/public/-files/hrl30rr.pdf (last visited May 7, 2005) [hereinafter
Rayman].
190 Barklow, supra note 2, at 336-37.
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same reason they wanted it to be enacted 45 years ago - savings
in training costs.'" 1 As more pilots reach age 60 and retire, air-
lines will have to provide more training for younger or new pi-
lots to take the retired pilots' positions. ' 2 Just by increasing the
retirement age to 65, the airlines could save tremendously in
training costs."' 3 In addition, airlines realize experienced pilots
are valuable.9 4 As the current CEO of AA said in support of
modifying the rule, "[having] the ability to retain the services of
our senior, well-trained captains for a few more years would re-
present a step forward in our efforts to be certain that Ameri-
can's cockpits are always manned by the most qualified
people."'19 5
Health organizations such as Civil Aviation Medicine Associa-
tion, EEOC, AARP and the National Institutes of Health
("NIH") also have expressed support for a change in the rule.' 96
The NIH originally stated that the FAA should retain the rule
temporarily, despite the fact that its own study shows no rela-
tionship between pilots' ages and accident rates.'9 y However, in
1985, the NIH abandoned its original position and concluded
that "medical testing of pilots after age 60 was both possible and
desirable."' 98 Now, the NIH supports overturning the "Age 60
Rule."' 99
The organization that has recently changed its attitude toward
this issue is the ALPA. Many predict that the ALPA will soon
switch its position to favor overturning the rule."' Actually, the
ALPA was the first to challenge the rule shortly after it was en-
acted.2 "" In its lawsuit to seek an injunction against the FAA in
1959, it claimed "the rule 'was arbitrary, discriminatory and
without reasonable relation to the standards set forth' in the





19 Raphael, supra note 58.
197 Czaplyski, supra note 72.
198 Id.
n99 See id.
200 Russ Niles, Pilots' Union Rethinks Retirement Age, Nov. 29, 2004, at http://
www.avveb.com/newswire/10_49a/leadnews/188659-1.html (last visit Sept. 15,
2005).
2111 Barklow, supra note 2, at 339.
2 02 Id. at 340.
2005] AGE 60 RULE 343
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tion to support the rule-in the 1970s because there was a demo-
graphic change in that period of time, as more younger pilots
were introduced to be flight engineers. 20 3 In fact, the number
of young pilots became was so overwhelming that they held
204about 70 percent of the memberships in the union. The in-
creased number of pilots, who were anxious to advance through
seniority into bigger and higher-paying jets, motivated the ALPA
to intensely lobby the legislation to retain the "Age 60 Rule" in
1979.205 Even though, in today's economy, one pilot's retire-
ment can make a difference between a layoff or an upgrade to
captain in another pilot's career, most pilots favor eliminating
the rule.20 6 This is because the large number of younger pilots
back in the 1970s, who fought fiercely to retain the rule, are the
ones who are currently suffering from the consequences of this
rule.20 7 They could not possibly predict in 1970 that their pen-
sion could decrease by 75 percent when they retire. The ALPA
plans to poll its 64,000 members on this issue in Spring, 2005.208
If the result of the poll favors elimination of the "Age 60 Rule,"
which it probably will, the ALPA will most likely change its posi-
tion on this issue to support the overturning this rule.20 9
D. COURTS DISFAVOR THE RULE
Unlike the organizations, courts cannot change their posi-
tions easily, as they are bound by legislation. Based on the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), courts do not
have authority to examine the validity of the "Age 60 Rule. 210
Based on the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), courts can
only evaluate the FAA's decisions to ensure that they are not
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law. ' 211 In other words, as long as the FAA
has some reason for its decisions, courts may not invalidate
them.212 Judges defer to agencies' expertise "when enforcing
203 Letter from Wilkening, supra note 174; Chronology, supra note 11.
204 Dave Gwinn, Is the Age-60 Rule Fair?, PLANE AND PILOT MAG., June 2001, at
http://www.planeandpilotmag.com/content/pastissues/2001 /jun/intraining.
html (last visited May 7, 2005).
205 Chronology, supra note 11.
206 Gwinn, supra note 204.
207 Adair, supra note 33.
208 Niles, supra note 200.
20- See id.
210 Profl1 Pilots Fed'n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
211 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)).
212 See id.
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the APA's requirement of reasoned decision making. 2 13 Be-
cause of these restrictions, most courts have ruled against pilots
challenging the "Age 60 Rule. 121 4 Nevertheless, courts have
been hinting that the "Age 60 Rule" should be eliminated or
changed.215
Over the years, pilots have challenged the rule under three
different claims: the ADEA, the APA, and exemptions from the
"Age 60 Rule."
1. The ADEA
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit, in Professional Pilots Federation v.
FAA, determined that courts do not have authority to invalidate
the "Age 60 Rule" under the ADEA because "the ADEA places
no limitation upon the rulemaking authority of the FAA."'2 16 In
this case, two individual pilots contended that the "Age 60 Rule"
violated the ADEA because the ADEA ensures that persons over
age 40 are employed based on their ability rather than age.2 17
However, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the FAA that "the
ADEA speaks only to employers. '218 The court based its conclu-
sion on the language of the ADEA, which states that "'it shall be
unlawful for an employer' to discriminate in employment upon
the basis of age."2 ' The court stated that if Congress intended
to give courts authority to evaluate the rule, it would have said
SO. 2 2 Since the ADEA could not apply to the FAA, the court did
not explore the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ")
exception. 22' The court concluded that "[it would] defer to the
FAA's decisions to retain the Age 60 Rule. 222
213 Id. at 776.
214 Id.; Yetman v. Garvey, 261 F.3d 664, 679 (7th Cir. 2001); Baker v. FAA, 917
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892, 897-98 (2d Cir. 1960). But see Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 957 (7th Cir.
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2. The APA
The pilots in Professional Pilots Federation v. FAA also chal-
lenged the "Age 60 Rule" under the APA.223 The Seventh Cir-
cuit stated that under the APA, it must approve the FAA's
decisions "unless those decisions are 'arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.' "224 The court set out linear thresholds for the FAA to
meet. 225 First, the court evaluated the FAA's response to the pi-
lots' proposed alternatives: periodic individualized performance
checks and gathering data from commercial pilots over 60 by
allowing some of them to continue flying commercial air-
crafts. 226 The court then concluded that the FAA did not abuse
its discretion because it "afforded adequate consideration" to
these alternatives.227 Secondly, the court accepted the FAA's ex-
planation of the need for the rule as adequate even though the
FAA did not provide any evidence to support its position.228 For
example, the FAA explained that it allowed younger pilots who
suffered from cardiovascular or neurological disease to fly while
disallowing the healthy older pilots to fly because there were
tests by which the status of a known disease could be reliably
monitored. 229 But as the dissent pointed out, "the FAA cites no
evidence in its support. ' 23 1 Moreover, the FAA did not explain
why the same tests that it employs to assess younger pilots' ex-
isting illnesses could not be used to make the same determina-
tion regarding older pilots. 23 '1  The majority, instead of
requesting that the FAA provide solid proof for its explanations,
accepted the FAA's claim on its face. As the dissent stated, the
majority's approach was incorrect because "the APA requires the
FAA to provide a sufficient explanation demonstrating that its
actions are reasonable. '23 2 The mere fact that the FAA consid-
ered the alternatives and explained its position was not suffi-
cient to prove the reasonableness of its actions.
223 Id.
224 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)).
225 See id. at 764-70.
226 See id. at 764-66.
227 Id. at 765.
228 See id. at 764-70; see also id. at 771 (Wald, dissenting).
229 Id. at 771 (Wald, dissenting).
230 Id.
231 Id. at 772.
232 Id. at 772 n.3.
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3. Exemptions from the "Age 60 Rule"
The most popular method that pilots use to challenge the
rule is by seeking exemption from the "Age 60 Rule. ''211 Pilots
would first apply to the FAA for this exemption. 2 4 However, the
FAA has never granted such exemption.2 35 Therefore, pilots
would then appeal the FAA's denial to the court of appeals. 211
Unfortunately, courts have also not been able to provide reme-
dies for pilots. 23 7
Although the Federal Aviation Act allows the FAA to grant ex-
emption from the rule "if [the FAA] finds that such an exemp-
tion is in the public interest, ' 28 "the FAA has established a
rigorous benchmark for proving that an exemption is in the
public interest. ' 23 9 The burden of presenting persuasive evi-
dence is placed solely on the petitioners (i.e. pilots). 240 They
must (1) prove "why the petition would be in public interest;"
(2) provide "the reason why the exemption would not adversely
affect safety;" and (3) propose alternatives, "to assess an individ-
ual pilot's abilities and risks of subtle and sudden incapacita-
tion. 24' Courts in these cases cannot examine the validity of the
"Age 60 Rule" or 'judge whether the petitioning pilots are fit to
fly." '242 They can only examine the FAA's denial to ensure that it
is not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law."' 243 Basically, the courts' role is
limited to examining "whether the FAA has appropriately con-
sidered the evidence" and if it "provided sufficient justifications
for its decisions. '244 It is not allowed to "delve into the motiva-
tions of the agency. ' '245 This is the reason that courts have beenaffirming the FAA's denial of exemptions from the rule. As the
233 See e.g., Yetman v. Garey, 261 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 2001); Baker v. FAA,
917 F.2d 318, 319 (7th Cir. 1990); Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 947 (7th Cir.
1988); Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307, 308 (7th Cir. 1978).
234 See Yetman, 261 F.3d at 667.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 See id. at 678-79; Baker, 917 F.2d at 323; Aman, 856 F.2d at 957; Star, 589
F.2d at 316.
238 Yetman, 261 F.3d at 668.
239 Id.
241 Id. at 678.
241 Id. at 668.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 669.
244 Id. at 679.
245 Id.
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Seventh Circuit stated in Yetman v. Garvey, "While our review of
the evidence submitted by the petitioners might lead us to con-
clude that a strict age sixty cutoff, without exceptions, is a rule
better suited to 1959... Congress did not endow this court with
the duty to make such a policy judgment. 2 46
Although courts have not been ruling for pilots, they have re-
petitively hinted their disfavor of the "Age 60 Rule." For exam-
ple, in Baker v. FAA, the Seventh Circuit urged the FAA to
examine this rule carefully.247 The court added that the rule is
not "sacrosanct and untouchable. 248 It stated that "the rule
might be overruled if future evidence of accurate individual test-
ing so demands."249 This echoes the Supreme Court's opinion
in Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell.25 ° The Supreme Court, in this
case, was not called on to invalidate the "Age 60 Rule" or to
examine the FAA's decision; rather, it overturned an employer's
(i.e. Western Air Lines) denial of pilots' applications to be reas-
signed as flight engineers upon reaching age 60.251 Even
though the Court's role was not to examine the "Age 60 Rule"
per se, the Supreme Court emphasized the House Committee
on Education and Labor's report, which stated that the rule is
"'arbitrary"' and ... age alone is a poor indicator of ability to
perform a job... [because it] does not take into consideration
actual differing abilities and capacities.' "252
Although courts are dubious about the "Age 60 Rule," they
have continually ruled for the FAA under the ADEA, the APA,
and the applications for exemption from the rule. Maybe the
real reason for these rulings is because "[t] his stand relieves the
courts of any responsibility for safety issues that could remotely
develop from an over-sixty pilot flying an aircraft that was in-
volved in an incident or accident. ' 253 This is their "save-face"
position.254
246 Id.
247 See Barklow, supra note 2, at 352 (citing Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 318, 323
(7th Cir. 1990)).
248 Id. (citing Baker, 917 F.2d at 322).
249 Id. (citing Baker, 917 F.2d at 322-23).
250 W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
251 Id.
252 Id. at 410-11, (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-527, at 2 (1977)).




E. FEAR OF BEING BIAMED Is No LONGER A VALID EXCUSE
Of course, courts are not the only ones that fear being blamed
for any aviation disaster with an over 60 pilot at the controls.2 51
The FAA, legislators, and many other governmental organiza-
tions all try to protect their own interests. 2 56 After all, "no one
wants to tie the bell on the cat. '2 5' The change of the "Age 60
Rule" would be a no-win situation, from the FAA's standpoint,
because its duty is solely to protect the safety of the public, not
the rights of individuals.2 5' Therefore, the FAA is not likely to
change the rule on its own. Some political pressure must be put
on the FAA. This pressure should come from the legislators
who, contrary to the FAA's interests, are responsible to fight for
pilots' rights. With the aviation economic disaster and the pres-
sure from desperate older pilots, legislators are being forced to
face the issues that are created by the "Age 60 Rule." Soon, the
legislators will realize that the only way to resolve those issues is
to change or eliminate the rule.
The FAA's sole justification for enacting and retaining the
"Age 60 Rule" is safety. However, in reality, safety was never and
is not the justification for this rule. The FAA failed to establish a
link between aging pilots and accident rates in 1959 when enact-
ing the rule.159 But still it drew an arbitrary line at age 60 as the
cut-off age.2"'  The FAA continually failed to establish this im-
portant link. Instead, it relied on biased studies and disre-
garded unfavorable data. 6' More importantly, the FAA blinded
itself from profound studies which all point to one fact: that
chronological age is irrelevant to the safety performance of a
pilot. 212 Therefore, the "Age 60 Rule" does not protect passen-
gers' safety. More than 24 foreign nations have opened their
eyes to this truth and either eliminated or changed the rule. 63
The United States will soon be standing alone in its defense of
the "Age 60 Rule." Many organizations in the United States, rec-
255 Id.
256 Id. at 21-22.
257 Id. at 22.
258 Id.
259 See 24 Fed. Reg. at 5248.
260 Id.
261 See Woosley, supra note 62.
262 See Blum, supra note 172.
263 See CRAIG, supra note 181.
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ognizing this reality, are advocating to overturn the rule.264 Sim-
ilarly, courts also recognize the flaws of this rule.265 But their
ability to change the rule is restricted by the legislation. As the
rule's negative impacts have increased within the last few years
due to the negative changes in the airline industry and the aging
of the baby boomers, the call for elimination of the rule is more
urgent now than ever. The FAA can no longer hide behind the
"safety" shield. It must face the truth and adopt a better
alternative.
III. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
Many studies, in concluding that the aging of pilots does not
cause aviation accidents, have recommended various possible,
better alternatives. Although the goal of this Comment is not to
explore the alternatives in detail, it is important to summarize
the recommendations here for future consideration.
The most recent report from the Aerospace Medical Associa-
tion summarized the recommended, possible alternatives. 266
The first plausible solution is to abandon the "Age 60 Rule"
completely. 267 Many other countries, such as Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand, have followed this path and have so far been
successful.268 This alternative is the least costly and most practi-
cal because nothing will change with the current performance
testing process, except there will no longer be a maximum age
restriction. 26 9 Logically, this alternative may work because of
"the small number of accidents involving pilot incapacita-
tion. '270 Also, "[the] current medical and performance testing
of pilots at 6-month intervals appears to be successful in weeding
out high-risk pilots. 27 1
The second alternative is to change the "Age 60 Rule" and
increase the age limit to age 65.272 This alternative has been
proposed by many legislators in the U.S. Congress because "[it]
is comparable to one made by a major FAA-sponsored study (the
264 See Barklow, supra note 2, at 335-37 Raphael, supra note 58; Niles, supra note
200.
265 See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 411; Baker, 917 F.2d at 322-23.
266 Aerospace, supra note 12.
267 Id.







Hilton Study) that proposed raising the limit to age 63.27-'
However, the line of age 65 is just as arbitrary as age 60, unless it
is founded on solid, scientific proof. Many studies need to be
conducted to prove the validity of 65 as the cut-off age.
The third alternative is to replace "the age cutoff .. .with other
tests that would screen out pilots likely to [cause accidents] .,274
Although some countries have implemented this alternative, it is
not popular in the United States. -7 5 One major reason is that
this solution will involve "a great deal of time, effort, and ex-
pense. 276 In addition, all feasible tests must be identified and
approved before this recommendation can be implemented.
The last, but not least, alternative is to apply to the FAA for an
exemption from the "Age 60 Rule" and appeal denials to the
court on each individual case.277 Currently, this approach has
not worked since no pilot has ever successfully received an ex-
emption.27 s The problem with this approach is the time and
money it will cost courts to hear and resolve these cases. After
all, courts may not be the best route to change or eliminate the
"Age 60 Rule," as they are bound by the lenient law, which is in
favor of the FAA's role in protecting public safety.
The best alternative would probably be to abandon the "Age
60 Rule" and maintain the current tests on pilots. This alterna-
tive does not demand additional expenses and resources, as eve-
rything remains the same, except for eliminating the
requirement that forces pilots over 60 to retire. In addition, this
alternative would not sacrifice the safety of the passengers, as
studies have shown no link between the aging of pilots and avia-
tion accidents. Since the pilots' age is irrelevant to accident
rates, eliminating the "Age 60 Rule" would not have a negative
effect on the aviation safety. In fact, studies have proven that
the most important factor is a pilot's health status.27 - Since the
current battery of tests is sufficient in detecting pilots' health
problems, there is no need to implement additional tests.
273 Id.; HoUSE HEARING, supra note 15.
274 Aerospace, supra note 12.
275 Petitioners' Brief, supra note 8.
276 Tom Osborne, Are Mandatory Retirement Ages for Pilots, Firefighters, and Other
Professionals Really Necessary? (Oct. 12, 2004), at Forum AGE, http://www.age-plat-
form.org/forum/message.php3?idforum=35 (last visited May 7, 2005).
277 Petitioners' Brief, supra note 8.
278 Id.
279 See Blum, supra note 172.
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Therefore, abandoning the "Age 60 Rule" and maintaining the
current tests on pilots is the best alternative.
IV. CONCLUSION
A simple rule: commercial pilots who are 60 or over cannot be
pilots or co-pilots. 2 ° A truthful fact: the rule was enacted with-
out well-founded scientific proof.28 ' A sad reality: this rule is still
in effect after 45 years and is putting thousands of pilots in mis-
ery as they turn 60. This is what we are dealing with when we
talk about the "Age 60 Rule." For the last 45 years, we have per-
mitted the FAA to hide behind its shield of "safety" to defend
this arbitrary rule, which has not only taken away individuals'
rights, but it has also caused thousands of pilots to struggle
through their retirement in this devastated economy.
If the rule can truly protect public safety, any economic argu-
ment cannot win. After all, society's first priority should be to
protect the safety of our people. However, as this Comment has
shown, studies indicate no link between pilots' age and accident
rate.2"2 Although the FAA tries to argue otherwise, the studies
they rely on are biased and misleading.28 3 In fact, most reliable
scientific studies show that because of the experience that com-
mercial pilots accumulate as they age, commercial pilots who
are between ages 60 to 65 are actually the safest group com-
pared to pilots in other age groups. 2 4 Therefore, not only does
the "Age 60 Rule" have nothing to do with protecting public
safety, but it is actually harming aviation safety by prohibiting
the most experienced and well-trained pilots from entering
cockpits. Forty-five years of tolerating an illogical rule is
enough. It is time to act and defeat the "Age 60 Rule." We act
not only for social fairness but also for the sake of our own safety
on airplanes.
280 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(3)(c) (2004).
281 See 24 Fed. Reg. at 5247.
282 See Wilkening, supra note 134.
283 See Woolsey, supra note 62.
284 See Blum, supra note 172.
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